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The	Sonic	Effect:	Aurality	and	Digital	Networks	in	Exurbia	
Keywords:	sound	studies;	media	studies;	sound	art;	music;	deconstruction;	networks	
Abstract:	This	essay	examines	the	problem	of	medial	specificity	in	music	and	sound	art,	
giving	particular	attention	to	Seth	Kim-Cohen’s	call	for	a	non-cochlear	sound	art	based	on	
the	notion	of	“expansion”	that	has	been	decisive	in	visual	arts	discourses.	I	argue	that	Kim-
Cohen’s	non-cochlear	intervention	in	In	the	blink	of	an	ear1	might	be	productively	
pressured	towards		the	concept	of	a	“sonic	effect”	that	acknowledges	the	material-
discursive	particularity	of	sound	without	recourse	to	the	phenomenological	claims	of	
authenticity	that	Kim-Cohen	(correctly)	abhors.	In	service	of	this	argument,	the	essay	
extensively	discusses	a	sound	and	media	artwork	—Exurbia,	created	by	myself	and	William	
Brent2—that	leverages	the	metaphorics	of	sound	against	existing	understandings	of	
specific	forms	of	network	communication.	I	argue	that	the	conceptual	and	material	
dimensions	of	the	project	stridulate	in	a	hum	of	recursive	vectors	for	considering	the	
constitution	and	consequences	of	networked	aural	interaction.	Exurbia	can	thus	be	parsed	
in	terms	of	medial	specificity	precisely	because	its	digital	aural	materials	are	themselves	
discursive.		
***	
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		At	first	glance,	this	equation	may	seem	incorrect.3	After	all,	how	can	a	number	
divided	by	two	be	equivalent	to	the	same	number	divided	by	200?	Of	course,	not	only	is	the	
statement	not	impossible,	but	it	is	actually	possible	to	solve	for	�	almost	instantaneously,	
without	the	machinations	of	calculation	or	any	contextual	information:	the	only	possible	
solution	is	� = 0.		
Notably,	zero	is	an	utterly	abstract	number	(sic),	in	the	sense	that	it	does	not	make	
even	secondary	reference	to	a	concrete	material	base.	Thus,	while	the	number	two	(for	
example)	also	doesn’t	refer	to	anything	we	can	apprehend	with	our	senses,	it	is	at	least	
apparent	how	the	number’s	abstraction	is	theoretically	tied	to	the	empirical	world;	we	
can’t	imagine	“the	two	itself,”	but	we	can	imagine	two	apples,	two	cars,	two	options,	etc.	
such	that	we	can	functionally	connect	the	items	in	the	list	through	their	“two-ness.”	This	is	
not	the	case	for	zero,	which	is	utterly	foreign	to	our	physical,	positivist	reality.		
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The	point	is,	if	the	variable	�	doesn’t	indicate	anything	that	at	least	subtends	a	
concrete	system	of	logic	(wherein	�	may	be	abstract,	but	it	is	an	abstraction	of	some	
physical	thing	that	we	can	at	least	feign	grasping)	the	details	of	the	surrounding	material	
are	precluded	from	any	impact:	two	might	as	well	be	equivalent	to	200.	In	order	to	
maintain	their	specificity	the	details	depend	on	the	status	of	the	variable	because	it	is	the	
variable	�	that	is	invariant	in	the	equation.	If	�	is	not	understood	as	being,	a	priori,	a	
positive	substantial	element	then	we	are	unable	to	logically	deduce	a	difference	between	
two	and	200.		
If,	on	the	other	hand,	we	reach	beyond	the	equation	itself	to	limit	�	to	being	a	non-
zero	number	then	we	have	the	inverse	problem,	namely	that	
!
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		only	if	� = �.4	The	
problem	here	is	that	if	�	and	�	are	the	same,	then	the	equation	is	really	just	
!
!
=
!
!
,	which	is	
nothing	more	than	a	tautology.	Taken	together,	then,	these	equations	suggest	that	without	
the	possibility	of	unlimited	abstraction	the	limited	abstraction—the	ability	to	reach	beyond	
its	grasp—that	any	logical	relation	depends	on	becomes	tied	to	its	own	particular	
circumstance,	and	thereby	loses	its	prescriptive	power.	While	we	can	take	note	of	
tautologies,	we	cannot	reason	from	them;	that	is,	a	tautology	by	definition	tells	us	nothing	
about	the	system	or	circumstances	that	produce	it.	
Taken	together,	we	can	generalize	the	problem	that	this	equation	points	to	as	a	
problem	of	medial	specificity	in	the	arts.		That	is,	attempting	to	make	a	claim	about	a	
medium	�	requires	one	to	either	abstract	that	medium	from	direct	experience	(as	in	the	
first	reading	of	our	exemplary	equation)	or	to	impose	an	otherwise	arbitrary	constraint	on	
what	“counts”	as	the	medium,	which	can	only	lead	to	confirmation	of	the	constraint’s	
applicability	in	a	given	instance	rather	than	to	a	statement	about	the	medium	itself	(i.e.	if	it	
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is	true,	it	will	be	tautological).	Simply	put,	an	aesthetic	medium	such	as	imagery,	sound,	
paint,	stone,	etc.	must	always	point	beyond	itself	in	order	to	articulate	itself	as	an	integral	
system,	as	something	about	which	one	can	make	a	claim	of	authenticity.	It	is	both	necessary	
and	impossible	to	insist	on	medial	specificity.			
This	problem	is	familiar	to	visual	arts	scholars,	particularly	through	the	notion	of	
“expansion”	elaborated	by	Gene	Youngblood	in	the	context	of	cinema5	and	Rosalind	Krauss	
with	respect	to	sculpture.6	Related	to	différance	as	it	is	outlined	in	Derridean	
grammatology,	“expansion”	is	a	means	of	recognizing	the	porousness	of	an	artwork’s	
boundaries;	the	implicit	verb	in	any	frame	(i.e.	a	frame	is	a	framing,	as	Mieke	Bal	would	
have	it);	and	the	entanglement	of	artworks,	culture,	and	discourse.	As	Clement	Greenberg	
puts	it,	the	work	of	a	work	is	not	wholly	reducible	to	the	boundaries	of	the	work	itself,	and	
neither	are	those	boundaries	themselves	uncontested	or	fixed.		
While	this	line	of	thinking	is	old	hat	in	the	various	discourses	that	make	up	the	
visual	arts,	it	remains	only	peripheral	to	the	dominant	discourses	of	music	and	sound	art.	
With	respect	to	the	institutionalized	form	of	music	that	is	problematically	captured	by	the	
term	“Western	art	music”	(WAM),	this	is	perhaps	not	surprising.	There	is,	first	of	all,	a	
foundational	social	conservatism	in	such	music	drawn	from	its	colonial	and	sacred	
histories.	More	relevant	to	this	conversation,	though,	is	the	medial	purity	that	music	is	
endowed	with	through	its	constitution	as	music:	Walter	Pater’s	(in)famous	and	oft-
repeated	claim	that	“all	art	constantly	aspires	to	the	condition	of	music”	perfectly	
encapsulates	the	fiction	of	music	as	an	abstraction	in	the	first	sense	of	our	equation,	
relating	to	nothing	but	itself.7	That	is,	Pater’s	claim	posits	music	as	the	purest	of	the	arts	
precisely	because	its	“artness”	makes	reference	only	to	itself;	music	is	positioned	as	being	
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a-semiotic.	Seth	Kim-Cohen	points	out	that	this	perception	is	discursively	reinforced	by	the	
fact	that	“only	music	includes,	as	part	of	its	discursive	vocabulary,	a	term	for	the	foreign	
matter	threatening	always	to	infect	it:	‘the	extramusical’.”8	
Of	course,	not	even	a	musician	(especially	not	a	musician!)	would	claim	that	WAM	is	
entirely	cut	off	from	the	world,	and	indeed	even	according	to	the	most	idealistic	
understanding,	the	musical	project	would	necessarily	include	some	means	for	music	to	
affect	beyond	itself.	The	point,	though,	is	that	this	affect	is	not	always	considered	part	of	
music	“proper”	or	"the	music	itself,"	but	rather	what	music	does.9	What	is	indicated,	then,	is	
an	insulation	that	is	constructed	via	the	rhetoric	of	music.10	Thus,	it	isn’t	the	case	that	
WAM—to	the	extent	that	it	results	from	this	genealogy—misapprehends	itself	as	a	kind	of	
fixed,	extra-discursive	object,	lacking	a	sense	of	its	own	contingency	(as	such	a	reading	
would	miss	the	crucial	aspiration	of	Pater’s	claim),	but	rather	that	WAM	aligns	with	the	
way	that	the	modernist	(visual)	art	project	is	often	characterized,	which	is	to	say	as	evading	
“’objecthood’	[…]	by	being	the	active	(or	enacted)	site	of	internal	relations”	instead	of	
including	the	external	world	within	its	purview.11		
What	makes	this	a	problem	for	WAM—and	indeed	for	WAM	in	general	rather	than	
just	for	specific	musical	works—is	that	the	transubstantiation	of	sound	into	music	takes	
place	precisely	via	the	activation	or	summoning	of	this	rhetoric.	The	problem	thus	takes	the	
tautological	form	of	our	opening	equation:	the	rhetoric	of	music—which	consists	in	the	
fiction	that	sound	is	"shaped"	into	a	succession	of	sounds	that	can	be	situated	on	a	
continuum	of	musical	meaning—is	not	conceived	as	supplementing	a	material	base	that	is	
already	musical,	but	instead	is	the	very	music	that	it	promotes.	Put	differently,	something	is	
musical	to	the	extent	that	it	participates	in	a	rhetoric	of	music—i.e.	in	the	form	of	meaning	
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that	is	particular	to	music—but	this	rhetoric,	precisely	because	it	is	particular	to	music,	
only	comes	to	be	from	something	being	musical.	In	this	view,	"music"	comes	about	only	
when	sounds	are	made	musically	meaningful.	In	this	sense,	music	is	always-already	
simulated	music,	making	reference	only	to	itself.		
The	point	I	am	working	towards	is	that	one	cannot	address	problems	of	music	and	
discourse	by	simply	expanding	music’s	semantic	field.	In	the	language	of	second-order	
systems	theory,	music	can	catalyze	and	be	catalyzed	by	extramusical	factors,	but	it	cannot	
cause	them;	that	is,	music	can	activate	(and	be	activated	by)	social,	cultural,	and	political	
valences,	but	to	the	extent	that	these	factors	operate	via	logics	that	exceed	those	of	music—
and	vice	versa—a	systematic	distinction	remains	operative.12	To	characterize	the	rhetorical	
(e.g.	notated)	details	of	a	piece	of	music	(as	opposed	to	the	practices	and	institutions	that	
collect	around	them)	as	meaningful	is	a	project	that	is	both	necessary	(to	sustain	the	
implicit	value	that	it	is	necessary	to	invest	in	music)	and	doomed	to	fail	in	advance	
(because	musical	details	are	constituted	tautologically,	in	and	through	their	disconnection	
from	the	extramusical	world).	As	I	will	return	to	shortly,	music’s	medial	specificity	will	
always	risk	confirming	(without	necessarily	confirming)	its	a-political	valence,	which	is	as	
sure	a	sign	as	any	of	a	subsumption	of	agencies	into	a	pre-existent	politics	that	is	
indifferent	to	local	details.		That	is,	like	any	rhetoric	that	appears	to	possess	closed	borders	
of	signification	(i.e.	to	be	constitutively	insulated)	the	geneaology	of	music	that	flows	
through	Pater	has	in	fact	simply	naturalized	the	porousness	of	its	boundaries.	To	the	extent	
that	(as	Kim-Cohen	writes,	paraphrasing	Derrida)	“there	is	no	extra-music”13	it	necessarily	
follows	that	there	is	also	no	music	proper.		
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The	decisive	example	here	is	the	work	of	John	Cage,	which	would	seem	to	deploy	the	
very	expanded	field	that,	I	am	arguing,	music	cannot	avow.	That	is,	Cage's	extensive	use	of	
aleatoricism	and	his	positivistic	technologisation	of	silence	are	each	in	service	of	an	
understanding	that	would	move	music	off	the	page	and	beyond	the	purview	of	an	
intentional	composerly	rhetoric.	Quite	simply,	Cage's	intervention	expands	the	musical	
palette	to	include	sounds	that	are	"physically	uniquely	themselves"	independent	of	their	
notation,	completely	liberated	from	"abstract	ideas	about	them."14		
However,	while	such	gestures	broaden	the	rhetorical	palette	available	to	musicians	
and	constitute	an	important	musical	politics	in	themselves,	they	do	not	impact	its	purview.	
That	is,	the	expansive	inclusivity	of	such	practice	is	accomplished	via	a	colonizing	process	
that	in	no	way	addresses	the	discursive	insularity	that	prevents	music	from	avowing	its	
contingency.	This	is	the	case	because	an	enormously	problematic	assumption	lies	at	the	
heart	of	Cage's	project,	namely	that	sound	signifies	itself.	Thus,	as	eldritch	Priest	argues,		
Cage’s	effort	to	open	musical	experience	to	a	wider	materiality	[…]	could	only	
be	made	effective	through	a	rhetorical	manoeuvre	that	ciphered	the	semiotic	
remainders	of	sound	first	through	the	measure	of	duration	and	then	through	
the	 supposed	 paradoxical	 intentionality	 of	 silence.	 […]	 Any	 sound	 was	
musical	 so	 long	 as	 it	 was	 intentionally	 heard	 as	music	 and	 un-heard	 in	 its	
worldliness.	That	is,	sounds	are	musical	to	the	extent	that	their	being-heard	
articulates	 the	 intentions	 that	constitute	 the	 traditional	horizon	of	 listening	
musically	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 seeming	 to	 disarticulate	 those	 intentions	
that	tradition	places	on	the	composer.15		
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Douglas	Kahn	argues	a	similar	point,	noting	that	"under	the	guise	of	a	new	aurality,	an	
opening	up	to	the	sounds	of	the	world,	Cage	built	a	musical	bulwark	against	auditive	
culture,	one	founded	on	a	musical	identification	with	nature	itself."16	Kahn	argues	
convincingly	that	this	was	accomplished	precisely	through	the	techniques	that	Cage	shared	
with	visual	arts	discourses	of	expansion:	Cage	extended	the	process	of	musical	
incorporation	to	include	all	audible,	potentially	audible,	and	mythically	audible	sounds,	
until	"there	existed	no	more	sounds	to	incorporate	into	music,	and	[he	had]	formalized	the	
performance	of	music	to	where	it	could	be	dependent	on	listening	alone."17			
In	short,	the	medial	specificity	of	sound	mobilized	in	and	as	the	rhetoric	of	music	
acts	as	our	variable	�,	so	that	additional	elements	(� and �)	that	are	brought	into	relation	
with	its	redoubled	abstraction	do	so	only	to	the	extent	that	they	give	up	what	is	elemental	
to	them.	In	practice,	then,	music	can	never	be	medially	specific,	since	its	specificity	exists	
only	prior	to	any	particular	instantiation	of	it.	Or,	by	the	same	logic,	music	can	only	be	
medially	specific,	which	amounts	to	the	same	thing:	if	music	is	only	music	in	the	sense	
(pace	Cage)	that	music	is	only	what	we	hear	when	we	decide	that	what	we’re	listening	to	is	
music,	then	it’s	not	only	the	case	that	particular	instances	of	music	can’t	be	medially	
specific	(since	even	Cageian	music	would	have	to	be	defined	according	and	in	relation	to	
something	that	is	not	music,	i.e.	a	listener),	but	also	that	music	must	be	medially	specific	if	
it	is	to	be	conceptualized	and	conceptually	expanded	(i.e.	if	even	Cage	is	to	speak	of	it	as	a	
limited	concept	that	requires	expansion).		In	the	language	of	contemporary	media	studies,	
music	thus	presents	itself	as	an	origin	(i.e.	a	creation	myth)	rather	than	a	history.	
As	with	our	opening	equation,	the	problem	that	music	poses	requires	either	an	
arbitrarily	prescribed	limit	to	the	problem	or	an	acceptance	of	a	certain	tautology.	As	may	
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be	seen	in	the	blossoming	of	subject	matter	that	has	obtained	in	musicology	since	at	least	
the	1980s,	sustaining	this	problem	as	a	problem	requires	at	once	a	means	of	registering	a	
given	musical	practice	in	its	particularity—some	of	which	is	medial—and	continually	
resisting	the	lure	of	abstracting	from	this	medial	particularity.	
***	
To	speak	of	the	medial	specificity	of	music,	then,	is	as	fraught	as	speaking	of	the	“truth”	of	
painting,	sculpture,	photography,	etc..	A	fascinating	distinction—or	perhaps	difference	of	
emphasis—develops	in	the	case	of	music,	though.	In	the	visual	arts,	the	constitutive	
entanglement	of	works	with	that	which	exceeds	them	has	been	largely	addressed	through	a	
turn	towards	conceptualism	(in	the	broad	sense)	that	explicitly	engages	the	paradoxical	
way	in	which	the	discursive	valences	that	subtend	works	also	constitute	them.18	Music,	on	
the	other	hand,	has	dealt	with	its	excesses	through	sound	art,	which	“as	a	discrete	practice,	
is	[…]	the	remainder	created	by	music	closing	off	its	borders	to	the	extramusical,”	the	
parole	that	cannot	be	“comfortably	expressed	in	the	langue	of	the	Western	notational	
system.”19	Again,	though,	this	is	not	the	result	of	different	decisions	by	different	actors	
within	the	respective	discourses:	because	music	is	defined	exclusively	through	its	internal	
workings—because	music	is	always	in	an	important	sense	"pure	music,"	even	though	it	
never	is—there	is	no	other	option	available.		
The	problem	is	not	so	easily	solved,	though,	even	from	the	perspective	of	sound	art.	
Returning	to	Cage,	Kahn	decisively	notes	the	bracketing	out	of	discourse	in	the	apocryphal	
myth	of	the	anechoic	chamber	that	animates	so	much	of	his	reception:	in	addition	to	the	
two	sounds	Cage	hears—allegedly	that	of	his	nervous	system	and	of	his	blood	circulating,	
though	this	has	been	contested—Kahn	notes	a	third,	namely	the	one	asking	what	the	two	
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sounds	he	is	hearing	are.	This	is	a	crucial	insight	because	"such	quasi-sounds	were,	of	
course,	antithetical	to	Cagean	listening	by	being	in	competition	with	sounds	in	themselves,	
yet	here	he	was	able	to	listen	and	at	the	same	time	allow	discursiveness	to	intrude	in	the	
experience."20	Indeed,	one	could	go	a	step	further	to	insist	that	insofar	as	hearing	and	
listening	can	be	distinguished	along	the	lines	of	concentration,	to	listen	is	to	listen	
discursively.	Moreover—and	in	order	to	preclude	counter-arguments	constructed	around	
notions	like	"meditative"	or	"deep"	listening—we	should	note	that	this	also	means	that	to	
have	listened	is	to	listen	discursively.	Language	is	the	technology	through	which	experience	
is	registered	as	such,	and	this	registration	reveals	both	language	and	experience	as	always-
already	simultaneously	present	and	absent	in	their	relation.	21	
	 Emphatically,	the	soft-claim	that	listening	and	discourse	are	always-already	
entangled	yields	the	hard	(Derridean)	claim	against	what	Kim-Cohen	calls	the	"essentialist	
reading	of	the	two	great	bestowals	of	Cage	and	[Pierre]	Schaeffer—silence-as-sound	and	
sound-in-itself."22	That	is,	Kim-Cohen	criticizes	a	number	of	sound	art	practices	that	
leverage	translation	into	and	out	of	the	medium	of	sound	for	being	"based	on	faith	in	a	
fundamental	stratum	of	experience,	on	some	essential	ontological	state,	a	metaphysics."23	
Thus,	for	example,	he	criticizes	Rainer	Maria	Rilke's	fantasy	of	playing	the	groove	of	a	
coronal	suture	with	a	phonographic	stylus	in	order	to	articulate	its	"primal	sound"	for	its	
implication	that	"there	is	a	completeness	in	nature	and	that	our	sense	of	incomplete	
experience	[…]	is	a	product	of	our	inadequate	perceptual	faculties."24	As	Kim-Cohen	notes,	
this	perspective—which	aligns	with	the	broader	neo-Romantic	sensibility	that	is	made	
explicit	in	Rilke's	poetry,	but	remains	implicit	in	numerous	sound	art	practices	that	feature	
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similar	translations—is	predicated	on	a	belief	in	the	type	of	foundational	metaphysics	that	
Derridean	grammatology	so	thoroughly	deconstructs.	
	 Notably,	Kim-Cohen's	reading	of	Rilke	is	motivated	directly	against	that	of	Friedrich	
Kittler,	from	whom	the	example	is	drawn	in	service	of	an	argument	that	"sense	perceptions	
are	revealed	as	nothing	more	than	neutral	data	flows."25	While	an	extensive	engagement	
with	Kittler	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	I	will	note	that	the	connection	that	Kim-
Cohen	draws	between	sound	art	and	Kittler's	"interest	in	authorless	media	streams"26	
anticipates	the	way	in	which	I	discuss	Exurbia	in	the	final	section	of	this	paper.	Kim-
Cohen's	assertion	that	"contextless	data	is	gobbledygook"27	aligns	with	Exurbia's	
investigation	of	sound	and	networks,	where	the	latter	explicitly	engages	with	how	the	
relation	of	the	two	informs	both	and	helps	us	to	resist	totalizing	them	under	the	respective	
signs	of	their	nomination	(i.e.	"the	network"	and	"the	sound	itself").	
***	
An	implicit	question	is	posed	by	Kim-Cohen's	call	for	greater	acknowledgement	of	the	
discursive	vectors	that	are	active	in	sound	art	practices,	and	that	make	authentic	self-
presence	impossible.	Simply	put:	if	sound	art	loses	recourse	to	any	kind	of	sonic	
authenticity—i.e.	to	an	extra-discursive,	categorical,	a	priori	difference	between	sound	and	
other	sensorial	experiences	such	as	vision—and	is	entirely	captured	in	discourse	in	the	
same	way	that	the	gallery	arts	are,	what	distinctions	remain?	Can	sonic	practices	be	
distinguished	from	visual	ones?	Should	they	be?	And	of	what	would	such	a	distinction	be	in	
service?		
	 While	In	the	blink	of	an	ear	offers	an	important	intervention	into	the	rapidly	
proliferating	discussions	of	sound	art,	it	is	perhaps	a	shortcoming	of	the	book	that	few	
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examples	are	given	that	might	address	these	questions.	One	example	that	is	given,	
however,	is	compelling:	consider	the	insightful	reading	that	Kim-Cohen	offers	of	Jared	
Fowler's	Kosuth	to	Fowler	(2006),	a	piece	that	works	with	Joseph	Kosuth's	Text/Context	
(1979)	as	its	source	material.	As	Kim-Cohen	recounts,	the	original	(Kosuth)	work	consists	
of	"two	adjacent	outdoor	public	billboards	[that]	display	related	texts	referring	to	each	
other	and	to	their	respective	methods	of	linguistic	and	visual	communication."28	In	
Fowler's	treatment,	the	text's	visual	indicators	(such	as	"see"	and	"text/sign")	are	changed	
to	corresponding	acoustic	ones	(such	as	"hear"	and	"speech/recording")	and	are	"then	read	
by	a	speech	synthesizer,	with	the	left	text	on	the	left	side	of	the	stereo	field,	the	right	text	on	
the	right."29	Kim-Cohen	notes	that	"the	simultaneous	transmission	of	the	two	texts	
accomplishes	something	that	would	be	impossible	with	Kosuth's	original,"30	namely	the	
erasure	of	the	"literal	and	essential"	space	between	the	two	texts.	
	 The	provenance	of	this	productive	difference	is	underemphasized	by	Kim-Cohen,	
though,	which	is	perhaps	a	symptom	of	the	book's	avowed	movement	towards	a	non-
cochlear	sound	art	and	presumably	away	from	the	medial	specificity	of	sound.	That	is,	
while	it	is	impossible	to	insist	on	something	like	“the	sound	itself,”	it	nonetheless	remains	
the	case	that	certain	characteristics	flow	more	readily	from	certain	materials;	there	are	
material	differences,	after	all,	between	sound	and	vision,	and	it	behooves	us	to	be	careful	
not	to	collapse	these	distinctions	under	the	sign	of	discourse	as	though	the	latter	meant	
something	fixed	and	concrete.	We	can	note,	then,	that	there	is	a	danger	in	Kim-Cohen's	
reading	of	Kosuth	to	Fowler	of	implicitly	prioritizing	the	similarity	of	the	text	that	the	piece	
shares	with	its	source	material	over	the	different	media	that	distribute	it	(indeed,	such	a	
prioritization	is	even	present	in	this	sentence,	which	frames	the	text	as	the	content	of	the	
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two	media).	This	raises	the	question:	how	would	one	work	through	an	analogous	reading	if	
we	did	not	have	the	alibi	of	"shared	material"	created	by	the	a-medial	legibility	of	text,	an	
alibi	that	is	dangerously	proximate	to	the	notion	that	material	can	be	passed	between	
media	without	being	changed?	Simply	put,	if	we	treated	the	text	exclusively	as	information	
(which	it	undoubtedly	is,	though	not	entirely)	one	could	(mis)construct	Kim-Cohen’s	
reading	of	this	piece	as	assuming	precisely	the	type	of	metaphysical	underpinning	that	he	
criticizes	in	Rilke	and	Kittler.		
	 This	is	a	subtle	point,	and	in	no	way	opposes	Kim-Cohen's	reading;	in	fact,	he	points	
in	this	direction	by	highlighting	the	fact	that	Fowler	engages	the	Kosuth	piece	not	only	by	
appropriating	its	literal	content—which	would	be	the	informational	quality	of	the	text,	as	
opposed	to	what	we	might	call	its	signifying	capacity	—but	also	by	intervening	in	the	
conceptual	field	that	the	work	constructs.31	What	I	am	pointing	to,	though,	is	something	
that	is	often	stressed	by	systems	theorists	such	as	Niklas	Luhmann:	whereas	
deconstruction	emphasizes	the	final	undecidability	of	any	signifying	instance,	systems	
nonetheless	decide.32	 	
What	this	points	to,	then,	is	a	dimension	of	deconstruction	that	is	regularly	neglected	
but	which	is	integral	to	it:	its	performativity.	That	is,	the	Derridean	claim	is	not	so	much	
that	all	experiences	partake	of	language’s	instability	and	ambiguity,	but	more	that	our	
knowledge	of	them	does	(and	that	they	come	to	be	for	us	only	through	becoming	objects	of	
knowledge).	As	a	result,	the	inverse	is	also	true:	Derridean	claims	about	language	are	
predicated	precisely	on	language’s	not	being	understood	as	a	system	that	is	closed	off	from	
the	world,	but	rather	as	one	that	constructs	a	"border"	that	is	always-ready	seeping	
through	with	that	which	it	excludes.	That	is,	extrapolating	a	process	into	an	observational	
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register	(or	a	predictive	or	categorical	one,	for	that	matter)	in	order	to	delve	into	its	
meaning	is	not	a	neutral	endeavor:	understanding	a	process	as	a	process,	rather	than	as	a	
random	or	even	stochastic	set	of	events,	necessarily	presumes	a	frame	of	reference	that	is	
privileged	linguistically.			The	paradoxical	(linguistic)	logic	of	grammatology	is	
performative	in	the	precise	sense	that	every	constative	claim	enacts	something	
supplementary	to	itself.		
This	performative	dimension	of	deconstruction	is	crucial	as	it	marks	the	vector	of	
material	specificity—even	as	that	specificity	remains	under	threat	of	erasure—through	
which	we	can	insist	on	the	specific	implications	of	aural	experience	without	validating	the	
authenticity	of	that	experience,	provided	we	keep	in	mind	that	the	economy	of	such	
experiences	is	linguistic.	In	this	light,	claiming	that	sound's	"phenomenal	characteristics—
the	fact	that	it	is	invisible,	intangible,	ephemeral,	and	vibrational—coordinate	with	the	
physiology	of	the	ears	to	create	a	perceptual	experience	profoundly	different	from	the	
dominant	sense	of	sight”33	does	not	undermine	Kim-Cohen's	non-cochlear	orientation,	but	
rather	redoubles	it:	it	takes	the	materiality	of	discourse	seriously	enough	to	insist	not	only	
that	all	experience	is	discursive,	but	also	that	the	paradoxical	quality	of	this	discursiveness	
necessarily	produces	"extra-discursive"	experiences	as	part	and	parcel	of	its	movements.	
That	is,	experience	is	neither	reduced	nor	constructed	by	language,	but	intensified	as	
experience	even	and	especially	as	such	experience	is	under	erasure.		
***	
Returning	to	the	question	of	the	material	specificity	of	sound,	we	might	speak	instead	of	a	
"sonic	effect,"	a	term	through	which	we	can	emphasize	a	contingent	operational	frame.34	In	
this	understanding,	"sonic	materiality	operates	as	'micro-epistemologies,'	with	the	echo	the	
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vibration,	the	rhythmic,	for	instance,	opening	up	specific	ways	of	knowing	the	world,"35	so	
that	we	might	provisionally	side-step	ontological	questions	about	sound	without	sacrificing	
our	engagement	with	its	unique	material	capacities.	That	is,	an	operational	emphasis	
invokes	a	systems	perspective	that	articulates	the	double-bind	of	the	opening	equation	as	a	
necessary	element—a	necessary	impossibility,	if	you	will—of	the	ongoing	and	ever-
changing	articulation	of	a	sound/non-sound	difference.	By	framing	the	problem	in	this	
manner	we	can	eschew	any	definition	of	sound	but	nonetheless	maintain	the	validity	of	
questions	pertaining	to	the	unique	intensities	that	aurality	caresses.	In	this	way,	we	can	at	
least	postpone	throwing	the	baby	out	with	the	bathwater	by	directly	equating	sound	art	
with	the	other	gallery	arts:	even	if	language	equally	conditions	what	is	thinkable	across	
media,	the	effect	of	a	perceived	heightened	abstraction	in	sound	is	no	less	real.	Instead,	the	
task	becomes	one	of	describing	these	"extra-discursive"	effects	in	their	discursivity,	which	
is	to	say	in	such	a	way	that	they	can	couple	with	other	metaphors.	Such	a	task	is	not	
undertaken	in	the	interest	of	reducing	them	to	conceptual	practices	that	are	already	
familiar	to	us,	but	rather	in	the	interest	of	catalyzing	new	forms	of	nonsense,	new	vectors	of	
discursive	recursion.	In	short,	thinking	through	sonic	effects	is	an	attempt	to	avow	the	
performative	dimension	of	sound,	which	is	always	context-specific.	
This	is	the	context	in	which	I'd	like	to	discuss	Exurbia,	which	explicitly	pressures	
sonic	effects	as	they	obtain	in	the	context	of	contemporary	digital	networked	communities.	
What	I	will	show	in	my	analysis	of	the	piece	is	a	way	of	activating	sound's	(contingent)	
medial	specificity,	of	putting	it	into	play	in	order	to	learn	something	about	both	networks	
and	aurality	that	we	might	not	have	known	without	their	coupling.	If	these	lessons	remain	
contingent	on	the	local	instances	of	the	metaphoric	networks	that	they	mobilize	(i.e.	
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"sound"	and	"digital	networks"),	they	will	be	all	the	more	potent	for	it.	In	Exurbia,	then,	the	
bind	of	
!
!
=
!
!
	is	not	resolved,	but	rather	explicitly	sustained.	
Put	simply,	Exurbia	is	a	digital	sound-editing	program	that	has	four	distinct	features:		
• The	interface	is	time-intensive,	being	predominantly	aural	and	executed	in	real	
time;		
• Editing	is	destructive	(i.e.	there	is	no	"undo"	feature);		
• All	of	the	source	materials	(i.e.	the	sound	samples)	are	shared	among	all	users,	but	
are	used	to	produce	discrete	pieces;	
• Each	edit	on	a	single	user's	computer	impacts	every	instance	of	a	single	file	
throughout	the	Exurbia	community	(i.e.	the	materials	are	dislocated).	
Taken	together,	these	features	introduce	a	reflexive	component	to	the	otherwise	practically	
oriented	environment	that	to	my	mind	situates	it	as	a	creative	work	in	its	own	right,	i.e.	
rather	than	as	a	software	tool.	That	is,	Exurbia	is	an	environment	that	is	oriented	towards	
composing	works,	but	it	is	equally	directed	towards	an	engagement	with	the	process	itself	
of	composition	as	it	obtains	in	an	aurally	intensive	networked	digital	environment.		
In	essence,	the	piece	works	as	follows:	participants	navigate	to	a	website	where	they	
can	download	the	program,	upload	short	sound	samples	to	a	communal	pool,	and/or	listen	
to	other	users’	contributions	(both	samples	and	pieces	that	have	been	composed	using	the	
program).	After	downloading,	users	open	the	program	and	authorize	it	to	synchronize	with	
the	current	batch	of	sound	samples	that	are	on	the	server,	a	process	that	can	take	up	to	five	
minutes	and	is	necessary	each	time	the	program	is	opened.		
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Figure	1:	Exurbia	screenshot	featuring	the	following	program	windows	(clockwise	from	top	left):	initialization,	
synchronization,	and	saving;	system	messaging;	pitch-	and	time-shifting;	sample	insertion,	and	sample	and	edit	selection;	
amplitude	edit.	
Once	the	files	are	synchronized,	participants	can	then	begin	using	the	program,	which	is	
done	by	loading	any	individual	sample	file	and	applying	any	combination	of	twelve	
different	parametric	modifications	to	it	(including	multiple	iterations	of	a	single	
modification).36	Importantly,	and	unlike	in	conventional	editing	programs,	each	time	that	a	
modification	is	applied	the	entire	sample	is	played,	and	the	majority	of	the	modifiers	
feature	parameters	that	are	controlled	in	real-time	using	the	mouse.	Thus,	for	example,	if	a	
user	wishes	to	increase	the	volume	of	a	sample	midway	through	it	they	must	select	the	
appropriate	modifier	and	sample,	play	the	sample,	and	ramp	up	the	volume	slider	with	the	
mouse	at	the	appropriate	time.	Since	there	is	no	"undo"	feature,	if	participants	are	not	
happy	with	the	outcome	they	can	only	reverse	the	modification	by	attempting	the	same	
process,	but	attenuating	the	volume	rather	than	increasing	it.	
When	a	user	has	finished	editing	a	given	sample,	they	insert	it	into	a	"master	track"	
(which	is	completely	unique	to	each	user)	by	entering	a	start	time	in	seconds	into	a	number	
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box;	each	time	a	sample	is	inserted,	the	entire	master	track	is	played.	Notably—and,	again,	
unlike	in	most	digital	editing	programs—there	are	no	editing	options	beyond	these	
insertions:	samples	cannot	be	removed	or	re-edited	after	insertion,	and	no	global	
adjustments	such	as	master	volume	boosts	or	attenuations	are	possible.	
Crucially,	inserting	an	edited	sample	replaces	all	instances	of	a	sample	in	the	collective	
source	material	with	the	one	that	has	just	been	edited.	This	means	that	the	changes	apply	
equally	to	the	piece	that	the	local	composer	is	working	on	and	to	the	compositions	of	other	
users.	This	substitution,	however,	does	not	take	place	until	the	participant	finishes	their	
editing	session	and	shuts	down	the	program,	so	that	it	is	entirely	possible	that	a	user	might	
overwrite	material	in	their	own	composition	without	realizing	it	until	the	next	time	they	
open	the	program.	
The	sample	that	is	to	be	replaced	is	determined	by	the	program	in	a	predictable	series,	
and	is	indicated	by	the	time	in	which	the	sample	to	be	edited	was	selected.	As	such,	
participants	who	do	not	want	to	alter	every	instance	of	a	given	sample	have	the	option	of	
gaming	the	system	by	"substituting"	an	inaudibly	edited	version	of	the	same	sample	as	that	
which	is	to	be	replaced.37	This	is	a	cumbersome	process,	but	one	that	allows	a	degree	of	
preservation	from	the	consequences	of	one's	compositional	actions	in	the	environment.	
Indeed,	while	it	is	not	possible	to	insulate	one's	composition	from	the	activities	of	
others,	it	is	possible	to	(imperfectly)	predict	how	editing	activities	will	affect	others'	
compositions	and	to	act	accordingly.	That	is,	participants	always	have	the	option	of	
listening	to	the	most	recently	saved	version	of	others’	pieces	(finished	or	in	progress)	from	
within	the	program	environment,	so	that	one	can	get	a	sense	of	how	substantially	one's	
edits	will	impact	other	works.	This	is,	again,	cumbersome,	as	it	can	only	be	accomplished	by	
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listening	to	the	works	(i.e.	there	is	no	textual	component	that	would	tell	a	person	what	files	
are	being	used),	which	can	only	take	place	in	real	time.		Compositions	created	in	Exurbia	
are	also	audible	online	for	non-users.		
***	
It	is	precisely	these	technical	machinations	that	constitute	Exurbia’s	intervention	into	
notions	of	"the	sound	itself"	that	are	naturalized	in	digital	technologies.	A	central	
conceptual	gambit	of	the	computer	is	to	persuade	us	to	think	of	sound	as	data,	which	is	to	
say	as	extra-discursive	content	composed	of	discrete,	manipulable,	exchangeable	units.	By	
working	in	real-time	Exurbia	undermines	the	implicit	fixity	of	this	materiality,	an	
undermining	that	is	further	emphasized	through	the	program's	collective	siting	of	its	
"materials,"	as	well	as	by	the	way	that	it	conflates	the	process	of	creating	with	the	creative	
outcomes.		Consider	again:	any	alteration	of	a	sample	requires	a	complete,	real-time	
reiteration	of	the	sample,	and	this	reiteration	by	definition	alters	the	broader	context	of	the	
sample's	articulation	(by	overwriting	another	sample	that	exists	elsewhere)	such	that	the	
outcome	of	the	edit	exceeds	the	desired	change	that	precedes	it	both	within	the	individual	
composition	and	the	broader	commmunity.	In	short,	Exurbia	disrupts	the	injunction	to	
categorize	that	is	implicit	in	the	quotidian	notion	of	data	by	emphasizing	the	excesses	and	
slippages	that	are	constitutive	of	categories	insofar	as	the	latter	are	always	reiterative.	
Exurbia's	mobilization	of	the	sonic	effect	is	in	this	sense	a	material-discursive	
intervention,	one	that	amounts	to	a	participatory	experience	of	digital	musical	composition	
that	is	fundamentally	different	from	the	way	that	sound	is	typically	treated	in	digital	
settings.	If	it	is	cumbersome	then—and	even	in	some	senses	a	failed	work	as	a	result—
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these	impediments	to	smooth	usage	are	as	much	positive	markers	of	the	work's	difference	
as	they	are	negative	indications	of	its	failure	to	actualize.38		
At	the	center	of	Exurbia's	conceptual	gambit	is	an	obvious	downplaying	of	visual	
graphics	and	other	forms	of	data	visualization,	most	notably	manifested	through	the	
absence	of	visible	sound	waves.	In	this,	the	work	explicitly	contrasts	related	editing	
programs	(ProTools,	Garage	Band,	Audacity,	Logic,	etc.),	as	these	are	all	built	around	the	
waveform	as	the	basic	interface	for	manipulating	sounds	(Figure	2).	In	constructing	objects	
that	can	be	manipulated	according	to	their	own	instantaneous	logics	of	manipulation,	such	
programs	spatialize	the	temporal	element	of	sound.	Thus,	for	example,	a	waveform	editor	
treats	a	stereo	output	in	ways	that	are	inconceivable	in	real-time	acoustic	settings,	i.e.	as	a	
composition	of	independent	sound	files	that	can	easily	and	almost	instantaneously	be	
recombined,	disarticulated,	stretched,	reversed,	compressed,	moved,	muted,	"paused,"	etc.,		
as	though	the	piece	is	merely	an	object	or	an	image	on	the	screen.		
	
Figure	2:	Screenshot	of	ProTools	editing	environment,	a	standard	waveform	editor.	
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To	be	clear,	this	is	not	to	say	that	waveform	editing	somehow	robs	sound	of	an	essential	
quality,	but	rather	points	to	the	way	that	sound—which,	again,	is	always-already	mediated	
by	discourse	in	any	setting—is	constructed	in	the	context	of	the	computer's	metamedial	
metaphorics,	which	is	to	say	by	the	computer's	invitation	to	think	of	media	as	
interchangeable	through	the	language	of	ones	and	zeros.39		In	this	way,	waveform	editors	
invite	a	conception	of	sound	that	aligns	with	the	dominant	(visual)	paradigm	of	the	
computer	wherein	the	informational	content	of	a	message—in	a	definition	of	information	
famously	inherited	from	Claude	Shannon—is	literally	divorced	from	its	content.	Data—the	
lingua	franca	of	the	computer,	and	a	synonym	for	information	on	the	computer—is	
atemporal	in	the	precise	sense	that	it	is	constitutively	context-less:	data	is	that	which	can	
be	moved	from	one	setting	to	the	next	seemingly	without	being	changed.	
This	atemporality	of	data	is	of	course	not	an	extra-discursive	fact,	but	rather	constitutes	
the	fiction	through	which	human-computer	interaction	is	possible.	Thus,	we	can	more	
specifically	say	that	human	agency	vis	à	vis	the	computer	takes	place	at	the	fulcrum	of	its	
two	realities:	a	computer	is	both	an	ongoing	computational	process	(literally	voltage	flows,	
but	also	the	programs	that	are	constantly	running)	and	a	series	of	discrete	states	(i.e.	the	
window	and	icon	metaphors,	but	also	the	translation	of	voltage	flows	into	changes	in	
voltage	tracked	through	ones	and	zeros).	To	use	a	computer,	then,	is	to	map	these	two	
incommensurable	realities	into	the	impossible	totality	that	we	call	a	"computer,"	a	mapping	
that	is	achieved	by	spatializing	temporal	vectors.	
It	is	not	surprising,	then,	that	digital	sound	is	conventionally	overdetermined	by	its	
visual	components.	For	example,	one	can	sensibly	speak	of	"moving"	samples	around	and,	
moreover,	anyone	who	has	taught	such	programs	will	likely	have	received	student	works	
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constructed	around	the	appearance	of	the	waveforms	(i.e.	through	visual	symmetry,	or	the	
appearance	of	a	narrative	arc	through	the	addition	and	subtraction	of	active	tracks).40	
Exurbia	contrasts	this	tendency	not	by	eradicating	visuality	through	a	dark	interface	
(which	would,	in	any	case,	not	eradicate	visuality	at	all	but	merely	expand	its	purview	à	la	
Cage's	positivization	of	silence),	but	instead	by	using	visuality	to	instigate	the	types	of	
temporal	processes	that	are	constitutive	of	sound	in	analogue	settings.	Users	click,	drag,	
and	even	type	numbers	in	the	Exurbia	interface,	but	the	effects	of	their	actions—in	the	
sample,	the	composition,	and	in	the	networked	community—are	only	registered	aurally.41		
One	result	of	this	temporalized	interface	is	that	individual	opportunities	to	edit	in	
Exurbia	literally	go	by	in	an	instant,	since	they	take	place	in	real	time.	Editing,	then,	
becomes	less	a	process	of	"cutting	and	pasting"	and	shifts	instead	towards	"channeling	and	
remixing,"	metaphors	that	promote	the	constitutive	entanglement	of	the	edited	sound	and	
the	act	of	listening/editing.	Moreover,	this	phenomenon	is	heightened	by	the	exclusive	use	
of	destructive	editing,	which	again	works	to	resist	the	reversibility	of	signs	that	visual	
editing	programs	assume,	and	that	visuality	in	general	institutes	in	its	spatializing	capacity.		
Indeed,	sound	in	general	tends	to	be	resistant	to	being	represented	as	data	in	at	least	
two	ways.42	Firstly,	it	is	differentially	and	temporally	embodied	in	that,	as	Aden	Evens	
points	out,	“to	hear	is	to	experience	air	pressure	changing	[…].	One	does	not	hear	air	
pressure,	but	one	hears	it	change	over	time	[such	that]	to	hear	a	pitch	that	does	not	change	
is	to	hear	as	constant	something	that	is	nothing	but	change.”43	Put	simply,	this	means	that	
“to	hear	is	to	hear	difference,”44	a	quality	that	is	not	captured	in	the	positivist	framework	of	
data,	but	that	is	activated	in	Exurbia's	editing	procedures.	Indeed,	when	returning	to	the	
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program	one	can	only	listen	for	other	users’	interventions	by	listening	for	differences	that	
are	not	verifiable.			
A	second	way	in	which	sound	resists	being	expressed	as	data	is	through	being	
relational,	in	the	sense	that	it	resists	being	placed;	not	in	the	sense	of	Bourriaud’s	
“relational	aesthetics”	but	rather	in	that	it	is	never	quite	where	it	purports	to	be.	For	
example,	in	contrast	to	a	beam	of	light	panning	across	a	screen,	a	recorded	sound	is	
spatialized	via	a	relative	difference	in	intensity	between	two	polarized	loudspeakers:	if	it	is	
perceived	to	be	80%	to	the	right,	this	speaks	to	the	fact	that	the	right	loudspeaker	is	four	
times	as	intense	as	the	left.	The	twist	that	makes	sound	relational	rather	than	simply	
relative—and	which	extends	this	element	even	to	mono	sounds—is	that	the	sound	also	
isn’t	where	it	appears	to	be	(i.e.	coming	from	the	loudspeaker[s])	since	it	only	comes	to	be	
as	a	sound	through	the	differential	act	of	hearing	discussed	above,	which	is	the	very	act	that	
would	place	it	where	it	isn’t.	That	is,	the	sense	that	the	sound	is	coming	from	the	
loudspeaker	is	created	by	the	physical	palpation	by	that	sound	of	the	listener's	auditory	
system	(usually	and	most	prominently	their	ears,	though	never	entirely);	since	this	
touching	is	only	(paradoxically)	made	possible	by	a	(systemic)	separation	between	the	
"source"	and	its	reception,	it	is	not	really	sensible	to	speak	of	the	sound	as	originating	in	
the	source.45		In	the	case	of	Exurbia,	then,	this	is	emphasized	through	the	impossibility	of	
composing	in	isolation	from	other	users’	interventions,	even	though	all	editing	is	
performed	within	the	fiction	of	such	isolation.	
In	both	these	cases,	a	key	factor	is	Exurbia's	emphasis	on	"real-time,"	which	acts	in	the	
program	through	an	aesthetics	of	speed	and	dissipation.	That	is,	the	"real-ness"	of	Exurbia's	
editing	is	articulated	through	the	perpetual	vanishing	of	the	present,	through	a	constant	
		 23	
evaporation	of	the	"sound	object"—the	fiction	of	a	sample	that	exists	as	a	sound	outside	of	
its	sounding	articulation—	that	takes	place	precisely	through	its	(aural)	appearance.	And	
yet,	the	reverse	is	also	true	in	that	the	cumulative	effect	of	this	approach	is	a	painfully	slow	
experience	of	digital	music	composition.	According	to	anecdotes	from	users,	pieces	take	
roughly	40	to	50	times	as	long	to	create	as	they	would	in	a	standard	waveform	editor.	
Whereas	with	the	latter,	for	example,	one	might	make	any	number	of	edits	to	a	recording	
prior	to	even	listening	to	it,	in	Exurbia	each	of	these	takes	the	full	time	of	the	sample	and/or	
the	piece	into	which	the	sample	is	being	inserted.46	Here	again,	then,	this	slowness	in	
editing	amounts	to	a	qualitative	difference	independent	of	the	different	compositional	
decisions	that	flow	from	it,	because	it	temporalizes	a	process	that	is	regularly	thought	
spatially	(indeed,	even	the	term	"sound	file"	suggests	atemporality).47		
If	important	elements	of	Exurbia's	intervention	can	be	captured	under	the	sign	of	
temporality,	this	by	no	means	exhausts	its	metaphorics.	In	this	case,	we	can	additionally	
note	that	only	registering	edits	aurally	means	that	they	are	held	mnemonically	in	a	
different	manner	than	in	a	waveform	editor;	insofar	as	users	are	composing	"pieces,"	these	
pieces	are	made	of	markedly	different	“matter”	than	is	typically	the	case.	There	is	firstly	the	
dramatic	vulnerability	of	each	piece	to	every	other—due	to	their	use	of	a	shared	set	of	
samples	that	is	constantly	changing	in	ways	that	are	difficult	to	control—the	result	of	
which	is	a	constitutive	and	unavoidable	impermanence.	More	interesting,	though,	is	the	
way	that	this	forces	participants	to	internalize	their	compositions	in	an	unconventional	
manner.	Unlike	improvisational	contexts	that	feature	similar	levels	of	contingency	and	
ephemerality,	Exurbia's	compositional	orientation	demands	that	one	remember	one’s	piece	
as	an	entire	piece	since	the	only	way	to	know	if	there	have	been	changes	since	one	was	last	
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in	the	environment	is	to	remember	what	it	sounded	like	when	one	last	left	it:	edited	
samples	are	inserted	into	a	"master	track,"	so	that	the	implicit	injunction	is	to	remember	
the	piece	as	one	has	composed	it,	to	provisionally	bracket	out	the	contingencies	built	into	
the	system,	or	to	at	least	conceptualize	them	as	something	that	happens	to	the	composition	
rather	than	as	something	that	is	integral	to	it).		
Combined	with	the	slowness	of	working	in	the	Exurbia	environment,	this	emphasis	on	
memory	creates	a	sense	of	intimacy	with	the	work	by	giving	the	impression	of	a	greater	
portion	of	the	piece	being	stored	“directly”	in	one's	memory.	Here	again,	the	cultural	
dominance	of	visuality	is	pushed	against	itself:	we	are	so	accustomed	to	using	visual	
abstractions—textual,	iconic,	etc.—as	mnemonic	devices	that	their	absence	gives	us	the	
sense	of	a	"more	embodied"	experience.	Thus,	for	example,	we	typically	have	the	sensation	
of	conscious	cognition	somehow	taking	place	independently	of	the	actual	workings	of	our	
bodies,	in	contrast	to	which	non-conscious	forms	of	memory—commonly	called	"muscle	
memory"—are	often	constructed	as	the	self	to	which	we	should	be	"true"	in	our	decision-	
making.	The	speciousness	of	this	claim	in	no	way	undermines	its	effects,	and	indeed	it	is	no	
less	beguiling	when,	for	example,	an	individual	with	advanced	Alzheimer’s	can	still	sing	a	
childhood	song	while	accompanying	themselves	on	the	piano.	It	is	precisely	this	fiction	of	a	
mind-body	separation—integral	to	so	many	of	our	quotidian	activities,	despite	its	
unsustainability—that	generates	intimacy	in	Exurbia.	I	might	go	so	far	as	to	suggest	that	
participants	in	Exurbia	have	the	opportunity	to	“know”	their	compositions	in	a	"deeper"	
affective	register,	in	the	same	sense	that	an	ear-worm	can	be	said	to	crawl	more	deeply	into	
our	psyches	than	a	memory	of	a	visual	image	because	it	is	persistent	and	involuntary.48		
Accepting	that	any	ascription	of	agency	is	predicated	on	a	(necessary)	fiction,	we	might	say	
		 25	
that	the	conventional	fiction	of	"using	the	computer"	is	supplemented	in	Exurbia	by	one	of	
the	computer	aurally	"investing"	us	with	our	compositions.	
In	the	same	way	that	the	piece	pressures	the	metaphorical	dominance	of	vision	in	
contemporary	understandings	of	sound,	it	also	leverages	numerous	assumptions	about	the	
nature	of	community	as	one	component	of	the	immaterial	origin	of	online	social	behaviors.	
Importantly,	one	should	note	that	sociality	is	not	a	contemporary	add-on	to	the	computer	
(i.e.	coming	to	be	with	the	advent	of	social	networking	sites	like	Facebook)	but	a	crucial	
component	of	its	history.	As	Alexis	Madrigal	argues,	with	social	networking	sites	“We're	not	
giving	our	personal	data	in	exchange	for	the	ability	to	share	links	with	friends.	Massive	
numbers	of	people	already	did	that	outside	the	social	networks.	Rather,	we're	exchanging	
our	personal	data	in	exchange	for	the	ability	to	publish	and	archive	a	record	of	our	sharing”	
in	part	because	the	knowledge	of	having	successfully	shared	is	as	important	as	the	sharing	
itself.49	This	raises	the	question:	to	what	extent	are	the	communities	that	spring	up	as	both	
the	cause	and	effect	of	this	sense	of	sharing	specifically	dependent	on	a	record	created	in	
alignment	with	the	dominant	tropes	of	computational	visuality?		
Exurbia	gestures	towards	this	question	by	making	the	strange,	aurally	modulated	
individual	compositional	experience	that	it	offers	contingent	on	the	behaviors	of	an	online	
community.	On	one	hand,	Exurbia’s	communal	experience	is	characterized	by	a	
vulnerability	to	others	that	recalls,	say,	a	multi-user	online	game:	one	invests	a	significant	
amount	of	time	and	energy	creating	an	avatar—in	this	case	a	composition—that	is	from	the	
outset	oriented	both	internally	and	externally.	That	is,	the	avatar	acts	as	a	kind	of	
manipulable	virtual	mirror	through	which	one	amplifies	and	attenuates	certain	features,	
while	at	the	same	time	acting	as	a	screen	through	which	one	negotiates	a	social	community.	
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Vulnerability,	then,	emerges	in	part	from	the	recursive	discrepancies	between	these	two	
identities,	between	the	signifying	ecologies	of	the	mirror	and	screen,	which	catalyze	
activity	in	one	another	without	being	able	to	cause	it.50	
Exurbia	certainly	engages	this	paradigm,	but	is	peculiar	in	that	its	vulnerability	
doesn’t	necessarily	coincide	with	any	acknowledgment	of	one’s	impact	on	others.	That	is,	at	
every	level	of	the	program	visual	and	textual	cues	of	the	community's	actions	and	desires	
are	absent.	Unlike	most	online	community	art	projects,	there	are	no	chat	forums,	comment	
boxes,	or	even	counters.	There	is,	in	short,	no	way	to	collectively	narrate	the	connections	
between	communal	flows,	pulsations,	and	mutations	and	the	individuals	who	instigate	
them.	The	ethical	worlds	of	each	individual	and	the	community	are	isolated	from	one	
another:	the	community	acts	on	the	participant	by	interfering	with	their	relatively	intimate	
compositional	process,	but	the	participant	is	able	to	choose	whether	or	not	they	will	be	
aware	of	or	even	acknowledge	their	own	agency	vis	à	vis	the	larger	community.	That	is,	the	
link	between	digitally	networked	activities	and	online	communities	is	denaturalized:	unlike	
most	digital	settings	where	the	community	is	the	necessary	and	a	priori	stage	for	
articulations	of	individuality,	participants	have	to	actually	choose	to	seek	out	the	
ramifications	of	their	actions	for	other	individuals	in	Exurbia.			
In	beta-testing,	there	was	little	evidence	that	such	considerations	played	an	active	
role	(an	exception	being	instances	of	"griefing"),	which	raises	questions	about	the	relation	
between	sound	and	online	communities.51	Exurbia,	for	example,	might	be	considered	a	
means	of	testing	whether	a	predominantly	aural	environment	can	provide	sufficient	
ground	for	users	to	develop	a	sensibility	and/or	ethics	with	respect	to	other	members	of	a	
digital	network.	If	so,	what	changes	in	this	configuration,	and	how	can	we	begin	to	listen	to	
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these	voices?	If	not,	how	might	this	help	us	to	unpack	the	complex	considerations	that	are	
built	into	the	word	"community"	as	it	obtains	online?	While	it	is	a	cliché	that	Internet	
technologies	have	the	potential	to	both	kill	and	cultivate	communities,	Exurbia	realigns	this	
problematic	to	suggest	ways	in	which	Internet	communities	are	conventionally	constituted	
through	an	exaggerated	visuality,	specifically	through	vision's	spatializing	capacity.		
What	this	points	to—borrowing	from	Rosalind	Krauss—is	the	expanded	field	of	
online	community,	the	way	that	the	discourse	of	community	takes	part	in	the	materiality	of	
digital	networks.52	In	this,	Exurbia's	relation	to	network	communities	aligns	with	a	general	
tendency	of	sound	to	be	semiotically	parasitic:	sound	tends	to	be	implicated	in	other	
systems	and	rhetorics	of	meaning	(such	as	music	and	language)	but	is	not	itself	meaningful,	
except	through	the	recursions	that	it	introduces	into	these	systems.	Put	differently,	sound	
tends	to	intensify;	we	can	note,	for	example,	that	better	quality	audio	in	audiovisual	
presentations	encourages	viewers	to	perceive	visual	displays	as	having	higher	resolution,	
while	the	opposite	is	not	true.53	In	the	case	of	Exurbia,	then,	the	compositions	become	
avatars	by	virtue	of	the	networked	community,	but	in	so	doing	desublimate	the	visual	
orientation	of	"avatar"	as	a	locus	of	material-semiotics.		
If	the	very	nature	of	online	communities	is	thus	tied	to	a	specific	medial	expression,	
this	suggests	that	mediality	constitutes	a	potential	site	for	political	activity	even	(and	
especially!)	as	it	remains	under	erasure	and	contingent	on	its	discursive	context.	Thus,	
aurality—as	a	material-discursive	mode	of	affecting—might	in	itself	constitute	a	politics.	
Beyond	the	specific	challenges	that	it	raises,	then,	Exurbia	demonstrates	the	broader	
potential	of	thinking	the	problem	of	medial	specificity	through	specific	practices,	putting	
the	medial	specificities	of	sound	and	digital	technologies	into	play	in	a	way	that	emphasizes	
		 28	
their	operational	rather	than	categorical	dimensions.	In	this,	a	sonic	effect	is	not	only	
produced,	but	is	specifically	produced	in	the	context	of	that	which	it	affects	and	which	
affects	it.			
	 In	the	context	of	a	paper	about	the	problematic	of	medial	specificity	in	music	and	
sound	art,	Exurbia	thus	demonstrates	the	performative	dimension	of	medial	specificity	as	
that	which	both	undermines	any	constative	ontological	claims	about	sound	and	reinforces	
such	claims'	impacts.	If	we	are	to	speak	in	a	specific	and	historically	informed	way	about	
art,	technology,	and	culture,	keeping	the	imbrication	of	materiality	and	discourse	at	the	
front	of	our	minds	is	a	political	necessity.	Doing	so	does	not	consist	in	bracketing	out	
discourse,	but	it	also	must	move	beyond	the	implicit	tautology	of	saying	that	everything	is	
discourse	as	though	this	means	something	concrete	and	limited:	it	is	true	that	we	know	
things	only	through	language,	but	the	term	"language"	in	this	statement	greatly	exceeds	
mere	text.	Deconstruction	is	not	a	theory	of	textuality,	but	rather	a	theory	of	media	and	
meaning	of	which	literal	textuality	is	but	a	sub-variety.		
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23	Ibid.,	99.	
24	Ibid.,	97–98.	
25	Ibid.,	98.	
26	Ibid.,	100.	
27	Ibid.	
28	Ibid.,	233.	As	an	example,	offered	by	Kim-Cohen,	the	text	on	the	left	side	of	the	billboard	
begins	with	"What	do	you	see	here?	The	text/sign	to	the	right	presents	itself	as	something	
else,	something	we	could	normally	take	for	granted,"	while	that	opposite	it	on	the	left	reads	
"Can	you	read	this?	This	text/sign	to	the	left	expects	you	to	read	more	than	it	provides,	but	
it	provides	more	than	is	needed	to	mean	what	it	does."		
29	Ibid.,	234.	
30	Ibid.	
31	For	example,	he	argues	that	the	simultaneity	of	the	Fowler	"problematizes	the	cross-
referentiality	of	the	two	texts"	in	the	Kosuth.	Ibid.,	235..	
32	For	an	excellent	introduction	to	the	relationship	between	second-order	systems	theory	
(SOST)	and	deconstruction,	see	Cary	Wolfe,	“Meaning	as	Event-Machine,	or	Systems	Theory	
and	‘The	Reconstruction	of	Deconstruction’,”	in	Emergence	and	Embodiment:	New	Essays	on	
Second-Order	Systems	Theory,	ed.	Mark	B.	N.	Hansen	and	Bruce	Clarke	(Durham:	Duke	
University	Press,	2009).	Luhmann	situates	SOST—which	builds	on	Derrida's	damning	
critique	of	systems	theory	in	"Structure,	Sign,	and	Play"	and	elsewhere—as	"the	
reconstruction	of	deconstruction."	
33	Frances	Dyson,	Sounding	New	Media:	Immersion	and	Embodiment	in	the	Arts	and	Culture	
(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2009),	4.	
34	This	term	is	reappropriated	from	my	colleague	Caroline	Langill's	term	"living	effect,"	
which	she	in	turn	borrows	from	Norman	White.	Hereafter,	all	uses	of	the	term	"sound"	
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stand	in	for	a	nexus	of	sonic	effects;	I	use	the	short-form	"sound"	in	some	instances	only	for	
the	sake	of	grammar.	
35	Brandon	LaBelle,	Acoustic	Territories:	Sound	Culture	and	Everyday	Life	(New	York:	
Continuum,	2010),	xxv.	
36	These	modifications	are	all	standard	digital	audio	manipulations,	including	changes	in	
amplitude,	reversal,	granulation,	reverberation,	etc..	Such	modifications	would	commonly	
be	called	”effects,”	as	in	an	”effects	unit”	used	with	a	guitar.	I've	used	the	less	common	
terminology	here	to	avoid	confusion	with	the	way	the	term	“effect”	is	otherwise	used	in	this	
article.		
37	For	example,	one	could	do	an	"edit"	play-through	of	the	volume	parameter	without	
making	any	alterations.	
38	Of	course,	other	approaches	to	electronic	music	can	also	be	cumbersome,	and	
microsound	and	tape	composers	often	see	their	work	as	physical,	messy	interactions	with	
actual	material,	even	though	their	work	is	digital.	See,	for	example,	"Minimal	Objects	in	
Microsound"	in	Joanna	Teresa	Demers,	Listening	through	the	Noise:	The	Aesthetics	of	
Experimental	Electronic	Music	(Oxford ;	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010).	
However,	I	would	argue	that	the	frustration	of	working	with	Exurbia	I	am	discussing	here	is	
distinct	from	such	cases	and	is	in	some	senses	the	opposite:	it	is	difficult	to	feel	as	though	
one	is	making	a	mess	because	one's	actions	are	diffused	through	an	interface	that	makes	
them	slow	and	coarse.	This	is	more	akin	to	the	frustration	of	trying	to	fix	a	computer	by	
rebooting	it	than	it	is	to	the	trope	of	playing	in	a	digital	sandbox.		
39	See	Lev	Manovich,	“Understanding	Meta-Media,”	CTheory	(October	26,	2005),	
www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=493..	
40	This	claim	is	admittedly	anecdotal.		
41	There	is	an	interesting	resonance	in	this	respect	between	Exurbia	and	early	electronic	
instruments	developed	prior	to	screen-based	user	interfaces.	A	key	difference	remains	the	
network	component	of	the	piece,	though,	which	acts	like	an	(unprecedentedly	large)	inter-
computer	patching	system.		
42	Although	I	do	not	use	the	term	sonic	effect,	certain	observations	about	sound's	medial	
specificity	in	the	section	below	are	borrowed	from	the	Introduction	to	David	Cecchetto,	
Humanesis:	Sound	and	Technological	Posthumanism,	Posthumanities	25	(Minneapolis:	
University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2013).	Specifically,	I	argue	there	that	sound	can	be	
characterized	as	a	simultaneous	palpation	of	four	medial	vectors:	it	is	semiotically	
parasitic;	differentially	and	temporally	embodied;	relational;	and	multiplicitous.	
43	Aden	Evens,	Sound	Ideas:	Music,	Machines,	and	Experience,	Theory	Out	of	Bounds	v.	27	
(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2005),	1.	
44	Ibid.	
45	Tinnitis	offers	a	special,	fascinating,	and	not	yet	entirely	understood	exception	to	this	
scenario	that,	in	Steven	Connor's	hands,	redoubles	the	paradox	I'm	alluding	to.	See	Steven	
Connor,	“Auscultations”	(presented	at	the	Sonic	Acts	XIII:	The	Poetics	of	Space,	Amsterdam,	
2010).	
46	Pre-listening	edits	would	routinely	include	cutting	of	excess	material	at	the	beginning	
and	end	of	clips,	volume	normalization,	noise	cancellation,	etc.	
47	Moreover,	this	slowness	isn't	just	a	matter	of	the	pieces’	taking	more	time	to	make	and	to	
listen	to,	but	also	manifests	in	the	sounds	of	the	works	produced:	the	decreased	editing	
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acuity	that	is	a	paradoxical	companion	to	this	slowness	results	in	a	kind	of	coarseness	or	
clunkiness	that	is	particular	to	the	environment.	Where	compositions	produced	with	
ProTools	might	dance	lithely	across	the	stereo	field,	Exurbia's	compositions	tend	to	
stumble	along	with	the	impotently	brute	movements	of	a	toddling	child.	
48	This	is	of	course	not	always	the	case	as	there	is	significant	variance	both	within	and	
between	individuals.	However,	there	is	some	evidence	that	music	seems	to	more	regularly	
induce	involuntary	semantic	memories.	Victoria	Williamson	conjectures	that	this	may	be	
because	"music	is	more	deeply	encoded	than	words.	Music	activates	multiple	brain	areas	
(usually	more	than	simply	hearing	words)	and	can	activate	some	of	the	deepest	reward	
centres.	And	if	something	has	more	connections	in	the	mind	then	it	is	more	likely	that	it	
will	be	re-activated	compared	to	something	with	fewer	connections."	See	Victoria	
Williamson,	“Earworm	Interview,”	blog,	Music	Psychology	with	Dr.	Victoria	Williamson,	July	
3,	2012,	http://musicpsychology.co.uk/earworm-interview/.	
49	Alexis	Madrigal,	“Dark	Social:	We	Have	the	Whole	History	of	the	Web	Wrong,”	The	
Atlantic,	October	12,	2012,	
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/10/dark-social-we-have-the-
whole-history-of-the-web-wrong/263523/.	
50	That	is,	the	excitation	is	heavily	mediated	by	the	constraints	and	affordances	of	the	
system	that	is	perturbed.		
51	"Griefing"	is	a	term	typically	used	in	the	context	of	online	gaming	to	indicate	a	harmful	
action	done	to	another	player	through	the	means	provided	by	the	game's	design.	In	the	
case	of	Exurbia,	one	composer	overwrote	a	large	number	of	samples	with	silence.	See	
“Urban	Dictionary:	Griefer,”	accessed	August	16,	2013,	
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=griefer.		
52	The	question	of	whether	this	goes	both	ways	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	but	it	is	
certainly	worth	asking:	to	what	extent	does	the	discourse	of	digitality—independent	of	any	
"actual	technologies”—inform	our	offline	understanding	of	community?			
53	Brenda	Laurel,	cited	in	Dyson,	Sounding	New	Media,	140.	
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